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Abstract
Humans often falsely report having seen a causal link between two dynamic scenes if the second scene depicts a
valid logical consequence of the initial scene. As an example, a video clip shows someone kicking a ball including the
ball flying. Even if the video clip omitted the moment of contact (i.e., the causal link), participants falsely report having
seen this moment. In the current study, we explored the interplay of cognitive-perceptual expertise and event
perception by measuring the false-alarm rates of three groups with differing interests in football (soccer in North
America) (novices, players, and FIFA referees). We used the event-completion paradigm with video footage of a real
football match, presenting either complete clips or incomplete clips (i.e., with the contact moment omitted). Either a
causally linked scene or an incoherent scene followed a cut in the incomplete videos. Causally linked scenes induced
false recognitions in all three groups: although the ball contact moment was not presented, participants indicated
that they had seen the contact as frequently when it was absent as in the complete condition. In a second
experiment, we asked the novices to detect the ball contact moment when it was either visible or not and when it
was either followed by a causally or non-causally linked scene. Here, instead of presenting pictures of the clip, the
participants were give a two-alternative forced-choice task: “Yes, contact was visible”, or “No, contact was not visible”.
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that conceptual interpretations of simple events are independent of expertise:
there were no top-down effects on perception. Participants in Experiment 2 detected the ball contact moment
significantly more often correctly in the non-causal than in the causal conditions, indicating that the effect observed
in Experiment 1 was not due to a possibly influential design (e.g., inducing a false memory for the presented pictures).
The theoretical as well as the practical implications are discussed.
Keywords: Expertise influences, Event perception, Dynamic scenes, Causal fillings
Abbreviations: CI, confidence intervals; EST, Event segmentation theory
Significance
The current work is, to our knowledge, the first to com-
bine a study of perceptual-cognitive skills with event
perception and it is, therefore, mainly of an explorative
nature. We took theoretical research out into the real
world and investigated the role of top-down factors on
event completion by testing three groups with a differing
level of interest and experience (novices, players, and FIFA
referees) on a simple event-completion task (Strickland
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& Keil, 2011). Although there is considerable evidence
that expertise in sports domains is connected to superior
perceptual-cognitive skills, our results indicate no influ-
ence of these skills on event perception. They rather sup-
port a recent publication by Firestone and Scholl (2015b),
who concluded that perception may be largely indepen-
dent of top-down influences. Such a proposition not only
challenges our theoretical understanding of event percep-
tion, but also has substantive practical implications for
fairness in sports by strongly advocating the increased use
of technology instead of perceptual training programs for
match officials.
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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Background
During the FIFA World Cup tournament in 2010, the
referees made many controversial calls that influenced
the outcomes of matches so tremendously that the then-
FIFA president apologized for the referees’ mistakes. In
response, the use of goal-line technologies was officially
allowed in 2012, which since have become more and more
common at the very top levels of the game. The current
study was inspired by a controversial goal that happened
in a Bundesliga match in 2013, a match in which no
goal-line technology was used. The ball went through a
hole in the side netting and everyone, including the ref-
erees, mistook it for an actual goal. This rare phantom
goal demonstrated the limits and biases of human percep-
tion. Such a phantom goal is even more surprising in the
light of numerous studies that reported experts to have
superior domain-specific perceptual-cognitive skills (e.g.,
Williams, 2000), an expertise that even leads to an advan-
tage in motion outside the expert’s area (e.g., Romeas &
Faubert, 2015). Vision and perception are shaped by one’s
individual experiences and knowledge: the mental rep-
resentations of events. Such representations are recon-
structed and updated through experience and knowledge
and provide the basis for understanding the world around
us (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). However, constant recon-
struction and updating of mental representations make
event perception effortful and, thus, fragile. Strickland
and Keil (2011) reported a (possibly consequential) bias in
event perception: the event-completion effect. Video clips
that indicated a causal implication (example sequence: an
athlete running towards a ball – cut – a flying ball) pro-
duced higher false-alarm rates for pictures displaying the
athlete kicking the ball than video clips that did not imply
any causation. The authors suggested that observers either
confused online predictions (the ball will be kicked and
will bounce down the field) with actually seen elements
of the scene, or relied on schema- or principle-based post
hoc inferences (a ball bouncing down a field must have
been kicked).
Perceptual-cognitive expertise
A number of studies have reported that expert athletes
show superior perceptual-cognitive skills compared to
novices in sport-specific tasks, including visual cue usage
(Abernethy, Gill, Parks, & Packer, 2001; Ward, Williams,
& Bennett, 2002; Williams, 2000), visual search strate-
gies (Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams, & Philippaerts, 2007;
Williams, 2000), and recall and recognition of meaning-
ful patterns (Bell, Boshuizen, Scherpbier, & Dornan, 2009;
Lesgold et al., 1988; Reingold & Sheridan, 2011; Smeeton,
Ward, & Williams, 2004). In general, experts’ demonstra-
tion of perceptual-cognitive expertise can go beyond the
specific sports domain (Romeas & Faubert, 2015; Romeas,
Guldner, & Faubert, 2016) and can help, for example, in
learning complex neutral dynamic scenes (Faubert, 2013)
or to outperform novices in everyday tasks (e.g., crossing
a street as a pedestrian in a crowded inner city: Chaddock,
Neider, Voss, Gaspar, & Kramer, 2011).While the majority
of the reported studies intended to identify the excep-
tional perceptual-cognitive skills of experts by focusing
on pattern recognition, decision-making, or biological
motion perception, mainly aiming to create training pro-
grams or prevent incidents that result in injuries, the cur-
rent paper is interested in a fundamental understanding of
experts’ perception, or memory, of events.
Hypotheses
In the current study, we conceptually replicated the design
by Strickland and Keil (2011) and tested two expert
groups (football players and FIFA referees) and a control
group (students with no interest in football). We won-
dered whether the perceptual-cognitive skills of experts
would prevent the event-completion effect when observ-
ing familiar motion. Based on the currently most promi-
nent model of event perception, the event segmentation
theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds,
2007), prediction errors occur and an event boundary
is perceived when certain event features change (e.g.,
situational features such as spatial location and charac-
ters: Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009). If online predictions
of experts are more detailed, it may be more likely that the
missing ball contact is actually reported to be perceived as
a missing situational feature in the schema, and, thus, not
perceptually filled in. More specifically, a more detailed
representation would result in a lower false-alarm rate in
referees and players.
We do have reason to hypothesize that the superior
perceptual-cognitive skills of experts could prevent the
event-completion effect since they may process visual
information not only qualitatively but also quantitatively
differently, but the opposite could be the case as well.
Mann, Williams, Ward, and Janelle (2007) analyzed eye
movements of experts and novices and revealed that the
skilled performers required fewer fixations of longer dura-
tion to gather relevant information, compared to novices,
who made many short fixations. Thus, novices consider
the potential influence of all available visual information
while experts concentrate on the relevant information by
perceiving the multidimensional complexity of the situ-
ation (further examples are in Haider & Frensch, 1996;
Hattie, 2003; North &Williams, 2008). Expertise was also
shown to allow for a more efficient switch of attentional
foci. Underwood, Chapman, Brocklehurst, Underwood,
and Crundall (2003) observed that the scan paths during
driving differ depending on the expertise of the driver.
Novices were not able to switch their focus of attention as
a response to potential hazards, while experts constantly
monitored other road users. In the current study, the
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hardwired event schemata of experts could actually lead to
a stronger bias if the ball contact is considered irrelevant
information in the representation of the event. Or stated
differently, novices may have a more detailed schema of
the event (e.g., a ball kick) because, in their lives, there is
no need for them to condense the schema for more effi-
cient processing. Referees, however, have to make 3 or 4
decisions in eachminute of the actual play time (Williams,
2013) and, thus, they benefit significantly from filtering
visual information rigorously. On the other hand, experts
may have a more detailed schema than a novice due to
frequent exposure and the ability to switch their focus
of attention if needed. However, based on the EST, this
again would result in a stronger event-completion effect.
If experts have a rather global observational approach to
familiar scenes, they may even have event models that
account for missing information and changes in visual
information. The missing ball contact may then not be
surprising; therefore, it may not be detected as an error,
and will, thus, not result in the perception of an event
boundary but in an event-completion effect. Finally, it is
also possible that there are simply no top-down effects of
cognition on perception as recently claimed by Firestone
and Scholl (2015b). The two authors carefully reviewed
hundreds of studies and extracted general (design) pit-
falls of each approach to study the effect of cognition on
attention. We will discuss our results with regard to the
two disparate but interrelated systems of perception and
memory.
Experimental overview
To ensure that we really tested perceptual-cognitive differ-
ences in event perception – and not declarative knowledge
and analysis skills – we intentionally used video clips of
dynamic events that did not require knowledge of the
game, depicting actions that definitely have been observed
by each participant before, independent of their level
of interest in football. We cut out scenes from a real
match, including corner kicks, kick-offs, free kicks, and
throw-ins. In Experiment 1, we conceptually replicated
the design of Strickland and Keil (2011) and presented
the participants with (1) the complete sequences (i.e.,
including the contact moment), (2) an incomplete causal
sequence (i.e., excluding the ball contact), or (3) an incom-
plete non-causal sequence (i.e., excluding the ball contact
with a non-logical follow-up; example sequence: player
about to throw the ball in – cut – a different player
being fouled). However, note that our restricted sample
of experts did not allow us to run a between-subject
design as was done in the original study. To ensure that
our design would not alert the participants to the pur-
pose of the event, we left out one condition: a visible ball
contact that was followed by a non-causal scene. In Exper-
iment 2, we further controlled the design by showing
video clips that either included or excluded a ball contact.
Participants were fully informed about the probabilities
of each clip type occurring (50 %) and were given a
forced choice of the two alternatives (ball contact seen:
yes or no). The latter inevitably brought in the aspect of
attentional control by “knowing what to look for”; how-
ever, it helped us to understand further at which point
of information processing the bias has its origin. We are
aware, however, that our (or any) design may not be
able to grasp the fine line between perception, memory,
and post-perceptual judgment. Our results will be dis-
cussed with a focus on the event-completion effect and
its occurrence in different groups. Any interpretation con-
cerning perception or memory has to be regarded with
caution.
Methods
Stimuli were presented on 15.4-inch notebooks using Psy-
chPy (Peirce, 2008). The participants were seated at a
distance of 60 cm from the screen. Footage of a soccer
match of the Young Boys Bern against the Grasshoppers
Zürich that took place on 23 March 2014 was used as
stimulus material. The footage was compiled out of three
camera perspectives. Clips of about 20 seconds each were
created. Each clip consisted of two parts shot from differ-
ent camera angles. The assignment of clips to conditions
was balanced across participants in each experiment. In
general, the two parts of each clip were causally linked or
not (Fig. 1c or d), and the ball release or contact (kick)
moment1 (Fig. 1b) was visible or not. Figure 1 depicts
example sequences.
In Experiment 1, we conceptually replicated the design
by Strickland and Keil (2011) and used the following com-
binations of video clips (see Fig. 1): complete (A–B–C) vs
incomplete causal (A–C) vs incomplete non-causal (A–
D).2 In Experiment 2, the basic idea of the design was
similar; however, we measured only the detection rate
of the contact moment and further added a condition
in which the ball contact (B) was visible in non-causal
sequences as well (A–B–D). In Experiment 1, each partic-
ipant saw seven response pictures (see Strickland & Keil,
2011) after each clip. Three pictures were selected from
the first part of each clip (a yes filler), three pictures were
related to the yes-filler items but came from other parts
of the game, such as other players preparing for a cor-
ner kick (a no filler), and the critical picture depicted the
moment of ball contact or ball release (contact). The par-
ticipants were asked whether they had seen the picture in
the clip: Yes (“press 1”) or No (“press 9”). See Fig. 2 for the
response pictures for the example sequences (Fig. 1). Fur-
ther, they were asked to rate how certain they were about
their answer (on a scale from 1, not at all, to 5, extremely).
In Experiment 2, we showed the participants 40 clips
and asked whether they had seen the ball contact moment






Fig. 1 Example sequences (pictures). a First part of the clip. b Ball release/contact moment. c Second part of the clip: causally linked scenes. d
Second part of the clip: not causally linked scenes
(B in Fig. 1). Instead of response pictures (Fig. 2), we
gave the participants forced-choice alternatives: “Yes, I
have seen the ball contact” and “No, I have not seen the
ball contact”. The experiment was conducted as a mixed
2 (ball contact visible, within) × 2 (second part of the
clip: causal or non-causal, between) subject design. We
measured the sensitivity to the contact moments as d′
and response criterion c (see Experiment 2 for further
details).3
An expertise questionnaire tested basic declarative foot-
ball knowledge using 11 questions, for example, “In
which country did the last FIFA World Cup take place?”
(see Additional file 1: Appendix for a complete list of
questions).
Statistical analysis
In Experiment 1, we report expertise knowledge, propor-
tion correct, proportion of yes answers, and confidence
in the recognition test as separate dependent variables.
Because of the binary response variable (yes or no), we
analyzed effects on proportion correct and proportion
of yes answers with a generalized mixed effect model
(with a logit link), using the lme4 package (Bates, Sarkar,
Bates, & Matrix, 2007; Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, & Sarkar,
Fig. 2 Example response pictures. 1: Contact, 2: yes filler (selected from the first part of the clip), 3: no filler (not in the clip)
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2006) in the R environment (R Development Core Team,
2016). Participants were specified as the random factor
to control for their associated intraclass correlation. We
present the type IIWald χ2 test results fromGLMER. Fur-
ther, we provide the results of planned contrasts (based
on our hypotheses and the original study’s results). Addi-
tionally, the credibility of the found null effect and the
likelihood of the occurrence of the null and the alterna-
tive hypotheses are presented with Bayesian statistics and
JASP (JASP Team, 2016). In Experiment 2, we report the
sensitivity measure d′.
Experiment 1: Conceptual replication of the original study
with groups with different expertise levels
Method
Participants Three groups of participants were tested on
three different occasions. There were 42 novices (14 male
and 28 female students, age M = 25.76, SD = 6.81 years),
16 football players of a seventh German football league
(all male, age M = 24.81, SD = 3.64 years), and 18 refer-
ees from Switzerland appointed as officials for matches in
competitions organized by the Fédération Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA) (all male, age M = 32.2,
SD = 4.93 years). Two referees were excluded because
they retired from their active positions as official FIFA
referees. The students tested participated in return for
monetary compensation or course credits. The football
players were students of the University of Tuebingen’s
department of sports science and their participation was a
course requirement. The referees participated during one
of their regular advanced training courses and were not
compensated monetarily.
Design and procedure The first part of each clip was
between 11.6 and 15.1 seconds long. A keeper during a
kick-off was depicted in three clips, a throw-in in one
clip, a corner kick in three clips, and a free kick in two
clips. A clip was either shown completely or shortened by
the removal of the moment of ball contact (kick) or ball
release (throw-in). We deleted 1–4 frames; however, the
deletion for causal and non-causal clips was always exactly
the same. The second part of the clip lasted between 5.7
and 8.4 seconds. Each participant saw nine clips spread
equally across three conditions: complete first part with
causally linked second part (complete), shortened first
part with causally linked second part (incomplete with
causally linked sequence), or shortened first part with sec-
ond part that was not causally linked (incomplete with
non-causally linked sequence). See Fig. 1, combinations
A–B–C, A–C, and A–D. The experiment reported here
took 15 minutes. The participants received instructions
and immediately started with the event-completion task.
After each clip, seven response pictures (Strickland &Keil,
2011) were shown (see Fig. 2).
Results
Expertise knowledge We calculated the proportion of
correctly answered questions. The football players’ declar-
ative football knowledge was significantly higher com-
pared to the novices’ (M = .86, SD = .34 and M = .51,
SD = .50, respectively): t(50.83) = 10.70, p < .001. We
regarded the referees’ football knowledge as a precondi-
tion for their FIFA employment and did not test them on
the questionnaire.
Proportion correct We analyzed participants’ perfor-
mance in the recognition test. Because the critical contact
itemwas a target item in the complete condition and a dis-
tractor item in the remaining two conditions, we excluded
this item from this analysis. We calculated the proportion
of correctly answered questions and fitted a generalized
mixed effect model with the binary dependent variable
yes/no answers. Expertise was inserted as the fixed effect,
and participants were specified as the random factor.
The factor expertise was significant [χ2(2) = 17.621 and
p < .01]. Post-hoc Tukey comparisons helped to spec-
ify the difference between the three groups of expertise.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the two expert groups outper-
formed the novices: for players vs novices z = 3.33 and p
< .01, and for referees vs novices z = 3.254 and p < .01.
We observed no differences between the players’ and the
referees’ performance (z = 0.06, p = .99).
Proportion of yes answers. We analyzed the effects on
the binary dependent variable (yes/no answers) with a
generalized linear mixed model (with a logit link), using
the lme4 package in the R environment. Participants were
specified as a random factor to control for their associated
intraclass correlation. We used the raw data and fitted a
Fig. 3 Performance in the recognition test (excluding the critical
contact item) as a function of expertise. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean
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model including all main effects and interactions of exper-
tise, item type, and condition as fixed effects. We analyzed
the resulting model using type II Wald χ2 tests.
Our main finding is a significant two-way interaction of
condition and item type [χ2(4) = 11.52 and p= .021]. The
three-way interaction of expertise, condition, and item
type was not significant [χ2(8) = 6.91 and p = .546].
Further, there was a significant main effect of item type
[χ2(2) = 1262.00 and p < .001], and a significant inter-
action of expertise and item type [χ2(4) = 41.05 and
p < .001]. None of the other main effects and interac-
tions reached significance , p > .17. While the proportion
of yes answers in the non-causal condition was signifi-
cantly lower (as expected), it should be noted that the
false-alarm rate was still over chance level. However, our
findings are in line with the results found in the original
study by Strickland and Keil (Strickland and Keil 2011).
See Fig. 4a for the analyzed proportions in each expertise
group.
To investigate the interactive relationship of the two
categorical variables condition and item type, we calcu-
lated contrasts. The underlying glmer model was now
reduced (see Fig. 4b for the aggregated data used) and
did not include expertise anymore, since the given exper-
tise level (novice, player, or referee) did not interact with
condition*item type (non-significant three-way interac-
tion reported above). To prevent α inflation at this level of
the analysis, a Bonferroni correction (0.05/3 = 0.016) for
multiple comparisons was applied. Further insights into
the variability of the (log) mean difference between the
observed answers are given with 95 % confidence intervals
(CI).
As expected, two of the three contrasts produced sig-
nificant results. The number of yes answers (i.e., the
number of reports indicating that the contact moment
had been seen) in the condition with implied causation
(causal) differed significantly (z = 22.21 and p < .001)
from the number of yes answers in the condition without
implied condition (non-causal), with an estimated (log)
mean difference of 4.03, CI [3.60, 4.46]. The non-causal
incomplete condition also differed significantly from the
condition in which the ball contact was included (com-
plete condition), z = 16.51 and p < .001 (estimated
difference = 3.95, CI [3.52, 4.38]). The contrast of the
causal vs the complete condition was not significant,
z = 0.73 and p = 0.75 (estimated difference = 0.15, CI
[−0.36, 0.68]).
Bayesian statistics We calculated a Bayes factor anal-
ysis for the proportion of yes answers to the contact
items in the no causal implication and the conditions
with causal implication. The Bayes factor evidence for the
null hypothesis in a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA
comparing a model that included the main effects of
condition (with causal implication or no causal implica-
tion) and expertise (novices, players, and referees) with a
model including additionally the interaction of these fac-
tors amounted to 4.99, which is conventionally classified
as substantial (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province,
2012; Wetzels &Wagenmakers, 2012).
Confidence A repeated measures ANOVA was per-
formed with confidence as the dependent variable (see
Fig. 5). We observed a significant main effect of exper-
tise [F(2, 71) = 10.27 and p < .001]. Players’ and ref-
erees’ confidence was significantly higher than novices’
confidence , p < .004. Again, there was no difference
between players and referees (p = .501). Further, we
observed a significant main effect of item type [F(2,142)
= 27.20 and p < .001], indicating that confidence was
higher for the no-filler items compared to the contact
items and the yes-filler items , p < .003. The interac-
tion of item type and condition approached significance
[F(2,142) = 2.42 and p = .049]. In this context, however,
we observed no significant differences between the differ-
ent conditions with regard to the contact item responses,
p >= .247.
Discussion
To capture online perceptual performance errors, we pre-
sented video clips that implied causation (or not) and
asked the participants afterwards whether they had seen
certain pictures (or not). While overall performance (pro-
portion correct) was higher for experts than for novices,
all participants were prone to the event-completion effect
(analyzed with the proportion of yes answers). Further-
more, we measured confidence rating to examine whether
experts show illusionary superiority biases (observed as a
coping mechanism for stress and self-esteem protection
in referees; e.g., Wolfson & Neave, 2007). We observed
higher confidence ratings in the referee and the player
groups compared to the novices – however, they actu-
ally performed better, thus, showing an actual superior-
ity instead of an illusionary superiority bias. This was
expected based on the experts’ superior recall and recog-
nition of meaningful patterns and details (Bell et al., 2009;
Lesgold et al., 1988; Reingold & Sheridan, 2011; Smeeton
et al., 2004). The results of the present study replicate the
event-completion effect measured in the original study by
Strickland and Keil (2011). The results exemplify how the
human information processing system struggles with per-
ceiving and recalling details of an everyday life event. We
found these difficulties to be independent of task-specific
expertise, suggesting that on a certain basic perceptual
level, if presented with a simple action event, humans
equally chunk or segment continuous activity, resulting in
the representation of a series of discrete events (Newtson,
1973) – a process that allows for online and post-hoc
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Fig. 4 Proportion of yes answers. a Proportion of yes answers for each expertise level as a function of condition (complete, no causal implication, with
causal implication). b Aggregated proportions of yes answers as used in the contrast analysis. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean
inferences, and illusory causal fillings. However, before we
interpret these results further, we need to ensure that the
effect found is not due to the study instructions, which
may have biased the participants to assume ball contact.
Participants may have assumed they had seen contact
because they did not know that omitted contact moments
were an option.
The question remains whether the observed event-
completion effect is a phenomenon based on online pre-
dictions or rather the result of backwards mapping, an
effect known from text comprehension research (e.g.,
Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988). Although, backwards
mapping was originally used to explain anticipation pro-
cesses during text comprehension, its adaption to causal
Fig. 5 Confidence rating as a function of condition and expertise. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean
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fillings in event perception is straightforward: partici-
pants base their decisions of a recognition item at the
very moment of presentation and check if the picture is
a plausible cause of what they have already watched. In
other words, a contact picture would be a plausible, and
natural, cause of a video clip that showed a football player
approaching a ball.
Experiment 2: contact – yes or no?
In a detection experiment, we presented participants with
complete and incomplete stimuli with causal and non-
causal continuation and asked them to indicate whether
they had seen the contact moment or not. This may
prevent backwards mapping because participants “know
what to look for” before the presentation of the video
clip. Further, without recognition items (pictures), the par-
ticipants are less prone to picture-based biases, which
allows us to measure participants’ discrimination perfor-
mance in the non-causal and causal conditions. If the
event-completion effect is primarily a phenomenon based
on online predictions, participants’ discrimination perfor-
mance should be lower in the causal compared to the
non-causal condition.
Method
Participants Altogether, 32 students of the University of
Tuebingen (7 male and 25 female students, ageM = 23.16
years, SD = 4.61) participated in the experiment in return
for course credits or monetary compensation. Of these,
17 participants were assigned to the causal and 15 to the
non-causal condition. We excluded from the analysis one
participant who did not understand the task. Thus, 17 in
the causal and 14 participants in the non-causal condition
entered the final analysis.
Design and procedure Then 40 video clips were shown
either as complete clips or with the ball contact excluded.
The first part of each clip was between 1.4 and 15 seconds
long. The clips were either causally connected or not (see
“General method”). We always deleted four frames before
the ball contact frame, resulting in a deletion of 160ms in
both incomplete conditions (the presentation rate of each
clip was 25 frames per second). The second part of the clip
was between 1.2 and 6.3 seconds long.4 Clips consisted
of 14 kick-offs, 5 corners, 13 throw-ins, and 8 free kicks.
Participants received specific information on the proba-
bility that the ball contact was visible (50 %). Further, they
saw a process graphic of a matchstick man approaching
a ball and kicking it so that they knew what “ball contact
moment” or “moment of ball release” meant. The sug-
gested experiment has been conducted as a mixed 2 (ball
contact visible, within-subject manipulation) × 2 (second
part of the clip: causal or non-causal, order was balanced
between groups) design.
Results
We report sensitivity (d′) and response criterion (c) from
signal detection theory as dependent variables (Green &
Swets, 1966). Yes answers to clips depicting the release
moment (complete conditions) were counted as hits and
yes answers to clips not depicting the release moment
(incomplete condition) were counted as false alarms.
Finally, we aggregated the data on the participant level and
calculated separate independent sample t-tests for d′ and
c. Because d′ and c are not defined for hit rates and false-
alarm rates of 1.0 and 0.0, we adjusted such values to half
a trial incorrect or half a trial correct, respectively.
Sensitivity Sensitivity (d′) was well above chance (d′ =
0) and was significantly higher in the non-causal (M =
2.75, SD = 0.59) compared to the causal condition (M
= 1.44, SD = 1.15), t(29) = 4.08, p < .001. Thus, this
supports the hypothesis that participants’ online per-
ception was distorted by the causal continuation of the
scene.
Response bias We did not observe a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the non-causal (M = −0.09, SD
= 0.32) and the causal condition (M = −0.20, SD = 0.38)
with regard to the response criterion (c), t(29) = 0.88 and
p = .388.
Discussion
We observed lower discrimination performance in the
group of participants who saw the causal sequel compared
to the group of participants who were presented with
non-causal sequences. Thus, these findings support the
hypothesis that the causal continuation actually changed
participants’ perceptions. A (cautious) explanation of this
finding refers to EST (Zacks et al., 2007). According to
EST, participants’ perceptions are based on predictions.
For a non-causal continuation, these predictions fail and
participants perceive an event boundary. As a conse-
quence, participants’ representations of this moment are
more precise compared to the condition with non-causal
continuation in which predictions were not violated and
participants did not perceive an event boundary.
General discussion
The present study was interested in the interplay of cog-
nitive and perceptual processes in experts compared to
novices. The main objective was to study the appearance
of the event-completion effect in groups with different
cognitive-perceptual training. However, our results also
give us an idea of how internal schema-based systems
and external sensory input processing may result in an
automatic completion of events. The results reported here
allow a number of interesting implications.
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Theoretical implications for event perception
The current most prominent model of event perception is
EST (Zacks et al., 2007). EST is based on various theories
of perception, neurophysiology, and language processing
(Carpenter, Grossberg, & Arbib, 2003; Fuster, 1990; Van
Dijk, Kintsch, & Van Dijk, 1983). A fundamental prin-
ciple of EST states that the processing of events forms
sensory representations that are influenced by experi-
ence and knowledge. Event schemata affect the current
content of the event models with top-down processes,
expanding their effective capacity by assembling predic-
tive information about the future relevance of certain
features of events. When certain event features change
(e.g., situational features such as spatial location and
characters; Zacks et al., 2009), prediction errors occur
and an event boundary is perceived. Regarding EST, our
results could be explained with an error-detection mech-
anism that operates on a temporal buffer holding a given
number of causal snapshots (Wood, 2011). The error-
detection mechanism constantly checks whether online
predictions based on working memory representations of
the ongoing event are fulfilled. Transient increases in the
violation of predictions (Zacks et al., 2009) make the cur-
rent event model useless and in need of an update. As our
results suggest, one missing snapshot of an event (implied
causation condition) does not automatically trigger an
event update because enough predictions of the event are
fulfilled. Clip sequences that did not imply causality may
have activated an error-detection mechanism and trig-
gered event boundary perception processes. The original
EST model describes event models as a stable represen-
tation that can only be reset or updated based on the
current perceptual information available when the error-
detection mechanism opens the gate. Error detection may
also play an important part in the actual perception of
events: the comparable number of yes answers for contact
items and causal yes-filler items in our data implies that
the event-completion effect is nurtured by the sensitivity
of the error-detection mechanism. In other words, the
more prediction errors the error monitoring allows, the
more illusory causal fillings will happen. Importantly,
our data suggest that expertise does not influence event
perception. That indicates that top-down processes do
not influence the simple mechanisms of online prediction
and error detection as much as is assumed in the EST
(Zacks et al., 2007). This top-down component, however,
is largely underspecified in EST. Zacks and colleagues
write: “This claim is based largely on parsimony and
may need to be revised in the future” (Zacks et al., 2007,
p. 275). At least for our stimulus material with sim-
ple structured events, the idea of an unaffected gating
mechanism is in line with Firestone and Scholl (2015b):
there are no top-down effects of cognition on
perception.
Top-down effects and the locus of contextual biases
Did the participants in our studies actually see (falsely
perceive) or did they simply report to have seen (falsely
remember) the ball contact? The presented studies
applied a recognition and detection test to explore the
event-completion effect. However, as recently suggested
by Firestone and Scholl (in press), there is a great dif-
ference between seeing and recognizing. Any top-down
effect measured can be due to an influence on front-end
visual processing but equally likely be due to back-end
memory. In the current paper, we communicated a ten-
dency to define the event-completion effect as due to an
error that occurs in perception rather than in memory.
Although we do not have clear evidence for either involve-
ment, the results of Experiment 2 (in which we decreased
the possible memory biases due to backwards mapping)
do indicate that the effect is partly due to online percep-
tional processes. We were further biased by the majority
of results found in the literature that connect memory
to experience. As memory fades due to brain damage or
aging, representations become increasingly changed by
preexisting knowledge. Especially popular is that patients
with Alzheimer’s tend to falsely remember details, words,
or events that they actually did not experience (confab-
ulation: e.g., Tallberg & Almkvist, 2001). However, expe-
rience and expertise did not influence the appearance
of the event-completion effect. Thus, reversing the argu-
ment, our results could show that the event-completion
effect cannot be an error in memory, because then
we would have found differences between the expertise
groups.
In a recent paper (Firestone & Scholl, 2015a), the
authors discuss semantic (language) priming, universally
understood as an effect on memory (Collins & Loftus,
1975) that may have been mistaken for top-down effects
on visual processing in various studies. In semantic prim-
ing, reading a word such as “peach” lowers the thresh-
old for related fruits in memory and they will be pro-
cessed faster than an unrelated word. Language and event
perception are closely related: much of what we know
about our understanding of events comes from stud-
ies that asked participants to describe an event in their
own words. For example, with such a linguistic account,
Talmy (1975) was able to define the building blocks of
motion events. However, it may be possible that the
observed language structure does not only reflect how
we perceive event units, but could be a general reflec-
tion of the preferred global-over-local approach of the
human brain (e.g., Fink et al., 1996). If we assume that
the activation of related words is comparable to the acti-
vation of related event models in memory (allowing for
faster access to different scenarios and faster process-
ing of related visual details), our null findings would
again point towards a bias on the perceptual level. The
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wealth of experienced scenarios of the event should have
activated a broader spectrum of experienced content in
the experts, which should have resulted in differences
between the three groups due to differences in memory
activations. Firestone and Scholl (2015a) further proposed
that it is possible to distinguish memory and percep-
tion clearly in practice. This seems to be a bold pro-
posal since false memories (here, an error of commission)
can be elicited within 1/20th of a second (Intraub &
Dickinson, 2008). Intraub and Dickinson (2008) report
a constructive error in scene representation, the bound-
ary extension, in which observers falsely remember an
image that is shown beyond the edges of the previ-
ously encountered view. When the first item is presented
without a scenic structure, boundary extension does not
occur (Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998). They pro-
pose that boundary extension is the result of a source-
monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993)
with a strong influence of a reality-monitoring error
(Johnson & Raye, 1981). The error happens when the
human brain has to distinguish between internally gen-
erated information (experience with certain structures)
and externally generated information (sensory input). The
authors suggest that the rapidity of such a boundary
extension error is advantageous rather than harmful; it
shows how the visual system incorporates fleeting views
of images with spurious boundaries into a coherent rep-
resentation of the world around us. The rapidity of the
error may further imply that perception and memory are
two processing systems of the same underlying cognitive
mechanism.
Our data could be explained as the result of a distinction
error between internally and externally generated infor-
mation. Disregarding the traditional distinction of false
memories and visual illusions and assuming an extraor-
dinary fast engagement of both during the processing
of visual input, the observed null effect of expertise in
our experiment may be the result of an imbalance of
weighted sources. The externally generated information
processing of experts may be more efficient and more
detailed; however, the internally generated information
outperforms sensory input due to the system’s need to
embed the event into known reality. Experiment 2 further
reflects the weight of the reality source. Here, partici-
pants knew precisely what would be tested in each trial
and were prepared to answer a specific question. Con-
scious awareness is needed to be able to report whether
the stimulus was visible or not (Lamme, 2003), but even in
such an enhanced state of target processing, the internally
generated source overruled the external sensory input,
resulting in decreased sensitivity for the detection of the
ball contact moment in causally linked scenes. For the
current design, the ideas mentioned above are pure spec-
ulations and may be regarded as such. Future research
could be concerned with whether expertise influences the
level (global or local) of event processing. For example,
Beaucousin et al. (2011) recorded event-related potentials
and reported that the meaningfulness of an object influ-
ences global and local information. They assumed that
knowledge about the world influences the global and
local levels of processing. Comparing the performance of
experts and novices on meaningful and non-meaningful
patterns would help us to understand better the early
stages of processing.
In addition, it would be interesting to see whether
experts compared to novices structure events differently,
measured as event segments indicated with a button press
by participants. Asmemory distortions can happen within
50ms (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008), behavioral measure-
ments may not be able to grasp the difference between
memory and perception (if there is any). To really answer
such a question, functional neuroimaging procedures are
advisable.
Practical implications
The present findings have a serious impact on the fair-
ness of the game. A red card may be based simply on two
single observations that perceptual processes have falsely
interconnected in a causal manner: player A approached
player B and player B got hurt. The match official may
be absolutely certain that they had seen a contact, but
it may have been an event-completion effect. The top
Dutch football league (Eredivisie), therefore, employs a
video referee who observes video replays of the game
to help the referees on the field with tricky decisions.
However, since many believe that the human element of
sports is lost when technologies are used, eliminating,
for example, the “enjoyment of debating mistakes” (Kelso,
2010), chances are rather low that other European foot-
ball leagues will follow the example of the Dutch. Even
in the presence of technology, the importance of the per-
ceptual and cognitive skills of match officials is, thus, not
reduced.
Limitations
It needs to be taken into account, however, that we aimed
to test basic perceptual processes and can, thus, speak
only about the organization of the mind when it is faced
with simple events. The perception of complex events
may nonetheless be influenced by domain-specific exper-
tise. For example, when presented with a deliberate dive,
novices may not be able to differentiate between whether
it was a real foul or a fake fall by the player. The cognitive-
perceptual excellence and the so-called intuitive skills of
an expert to analyze such an incident may be based on
a highly sensitive error-detection mechanism. Such ideas,
however, will require theoretical and empirical develop-
ment beyond the scope of this article. Left unknown is
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still whether memory or perception is responsible for the
effect.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the results of the present study demon-
strated a short-cut of the human information-processing
system to deal with missing information when faced with
causally linked video sequences: the event-completion
effect. We explored basic processes that may be biased
by an imbalance in external and internal source weighing,
based on the similarity found for three groups of expertise.
This indicates that the influence of higher cognitive pro-
cesses in the observation of simple action events may be
overruled by the human need to make sense of the world
and the need to embed an event into a known structure.
Bearing in mind that we tested referees who had
achieved the highest qualification level and who offici-
ated at international FIFA matches, it is fair to surmise
that the event-completion effect for simple events is hard-
wired. Perceptual training programs that focus on external
sensory input to prevent causal fillings of events will be
difficult to design. Finally, the observed effect illustrates
impressively that, without further game technology in the
future, football players, fans, coaches, and journalists do
not have to worry about losing the drama and the thrill of
being defrauded by the human brain’s biases.
Endnotes
1Note that we use the term contact moment through-
out the rest of the paper to refer to both the kicking and
releasing of the ball.
2Note that we present only one experiment event even
though there were two. However, the hypotheses and the
design were completely unrelated to the goal of this work
and will be analyzed and published independently.
3Note that a between-subject design was reported in the
original study but was not feasible in Experiment 1 due to
the small sample of referees and time constraints during
testing. In Experiment 2, we asked students to partici-
pate in the laboratory. Thus, using a between-design was
possible and, additionally, allowed us to ensure that par-
ticipants could not guess the purpose of the experiment
when seeing both critical conditions.
4Note that the length of the second part of the clip
was a natural consequence of the events happening in the
footage of the match and not an intentional manipulation.
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